This paper presents an anomaly detection method using a hybrid observer -which consists of a discrete state observer and a continuous state observer. We focus our attention on anomalies caused by intelligent attacks, which may bypass existing anomaly detection methods because neither the event sequence nor the observed residuals appear to be anomalous. Based on the relation between the continuous and discrete variables, we define three conflict types and give the conditions under which the detection of the anomalies is guaranteed. We call this method conflict-driven anomaly detection. The effectiveness of this method is demonstrated mathematically and illustrated on a Train-Gate (TG) system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are systems that are shaped by a combination of computing devices, communication networks, and physical processes [1] . The integration of these systems into our every-day life is inevitable. The performance and functionality of many critical infrastructures such as power, traffic and healthcare networks and smart cities rely on the advances on CPS. A fault or an attack on one of these critical systems, may affect a large portion of society with serious and lethal consequences. As such, the safety and reliability of CPS becomes more and more crucial every day. Fault, attack and anomaly detection mechanisms play a vital role in providing such reliability and safety to CPS. In this paper, we propose an anomaly detection approach that provides formal detection guarantees for an extended class of anomalies in CPS. Similar to [2] , we refer to any occurrence that is different from what is standard, normal, or expected as anomaly. In this paper, we utilize the rich dynamical behavior of mixed continuous and discrete (i.e., hybrid) systems [3] as our modeling framework to describe CPS. Even though the design and implementation of anomaly detection methods is significantly more challenging on hybrid models, we leverage these models, because of their advantage in better representing the real-world CPS.
Our motivational example is a Train-Gate (TG) system, consisting of a train and a gate with a road crossing the track, as shown in Fig. 1 . It is an abstracted example that captures one of the important characteristics of a railway system which is railway level crossing control system. The TG system is a hybrid system. The train with an internal speed controller is the continuous system. An external controller changes the reference train speed based on the measured train position such that the train passes the gate at a lower speed. The gate is a discrete system, which is raised or lowered by a controller using two presence sensors located on both sides of the road. If sensor 1 detects the train, the gate must be lowered down to stop traffic on the road. If sensor 2 detects the train, the gate must be raised up to allow traffic on the road. Two monitors are used to detect anomalies. One monitor detects anomalies in the continuous train system, which uses the continuous system model and compares the measured variables with the estimated ones. The other monitor detects anomalies in the discrete gate system, which uses the discrete system model and compares the expected discrete event sequence with observed one. If an anomaly is detected from either of these monitors, some actions should be taken to mitigate its impact. Fig. 1 : Train-Gate system schematic However, an attacker can launch an attack to cause an anomaly bypassing both monitors. For example, an anomalous ramp signal could be added to the measured train position without increasing the difference between the measured and the estimated variables. The drifted measured position can make the train pass the gate with a high speed, causing insufficient time to lower the gate. Meanwhile, a driver may pass the gate, causing an accident.
In order to detect this type of anomaly, we propose a higher level monitor to augment the previous two monitors. This new monitor uses a hybrid model of the system, and estimates both the continuous and the discrete variables. For the anomaly of a drifted measured train position, although the continuous system is anomalous, the discrete system is normal. If sensor 1 detects the train but the estimated train position indicates that the train is far away from sensor 1, a "conflict" between the continuous and the discrete variables occurs. This new monitor expands the types of anomalies that can be detected by checking the occurrence of conflicts, called conflict-driven method. Both mathematical demonstrations and simulation results illustrate the effectiveness of the conflict-driven method.
II. BACKGROUND AND CONTRIBUTION
Various model-based anomaly detection methods have been developed for both continuous systems and discrete systems [4] , [5] . Even though discrete model-based anomaly detection methods are computationally efficient [6] , they cannot provide sufficient resolution of continuous degradations for hybrid systems [7] . Continuous model-based methods are impractical for the diagnosis of hybrid systems with many different continuous dynamics because multiple continuous models need to run in parallel, each model corresponding to one continuous dynamics [8] .
As most CPS are hybrid, consisting of both continuous dynamics and discrete behavior, hybrid modelbased approaches are promising in anomaly detection. Hybrid model-based anomaly detection includes set membership-based methods [9] , [10] and observer-based methods [11] . Given a data trajectory, set membershipbased methods check whether the trajectory can be generated by the model. Even though these methods provide necessary and sufficient conditions in some cases for anomaly detection, they are computationally demanding, as they require costly set calculations or mixed integer programming. The set membership-based methods are also utilized in active fault diagnosis, where the goal is to design a minimal excitation that guarantees the detection of anomalous behavior [12] , [13] .
Observer-based methods assume the continuous component of the hybrid model is observable under both normal and anomalous operations. For most observerbased methods, a residual, which is the difference between the estimated output and the actual output, is analyzed to determine the occurrence of an anomaly. A hybrid observer is typically used because of its computational efficiency in state estimation for hybrid systems [11] . A hybrid observer consists of two components: a discrete state observer identifying the current discrete state, and a continuous state observer estimating the continuous state [11] , [14] . With the hybrid observer framework, various traditional residual-based anomaly detection methods can be applied for hybrid systems, including different residual generation methods, such as the dedicated and generalized observer scheme [15] , [16] , and some residual evaluation methods, such as adaptive threshold [17] .
Even though residual-based methods with a hybrid observer are efficient and easy to implement, they can be circumvented by a smart attacker or by sensor faults without increasing the residual while causing anomalies. An example of such class of anomalies is described in Section I. In this paper, we propose a conflict-driven anomaly detection approach with three conflict types defined based on the relation between the discrete and the continuous variables of the hybrid systems and in addition to anomalies that can be detected by traditional methods, it is capable of providing guarantees on the detection of anomalies that are undetectable using these methods.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we describe the system modeling that we consider and the anomaly types that are of interest. Also a review of utilized hybrid observer is given.
A. Notation
Let ⋅ denote ∞-norm,⋅ denote estimated variables, ⊍ denote disjoint union, and ◻σ denote the ball of center 0 and of radius σ . In addition, x ∈ R n represents a vector, where its i th element is indicated by x (i) . A ∈ R n×m represents a matrix. The linear span of a set of vectors is denoted by span(⋅). For a set X ⊂ R n , we denote its closure, interior, and boundary by X, X o and ∂ X respectively. Clearly, ∂ X = X X o . The volume of the closed set X is denoted by Vol(X).
B. System Modeling 1) Hybrid Model:
A hybrid system can be modeled as a hybrid automaton H = (X ,U,Y,Init, f ield,E,φ ,η), where each element is defined as • X = Q × X: a set of discrete and continuous states • U = Ψ ×U: a set of discrete and continuous inputs • Y = Ω ×Y : a set of discrete and continuous outputs
an output map consisting of a discrete output map ζ and a continuous output equation h ζ ∶ Q × Ψ → Ω: a discrete output map h ∶ Q × X → Y : a continuous output equation The hybrid models considered in this paper capture both nominal system model with a set of nominal discrete states Q n and anomaly models with a set of anomalous discrete states Q f . The set of all discrete states is defined as Q = Q n ⊍ Q f . The nominal hybrid system H n can be derived by removing Q f and the events and transitions connecting Q f . The initial state Init, which is a combination of initial discrete state q(t 0 ) ∈ Q n and initial continuous state x(t 0 ), is not required to be known.
For each discrete state q ∈ Q, we consider continuous dynamics represented by a Linear Time Invariant model, subject to process and measurement noise.
where
are continuous states, inputs and outputs, respectively. The process and measurement noise are represented by w ∼ N (0,W) and v ∼ N (0,V), respectively, where w ≤ w and v ≤ v. Each entry of the process and measurement noise has its bound, i.e., w (i) ≤ w i and v (i) ≤ v i . The continuous dynamical models of the system in anomalous discrete states are not required to be known. To simplify the notation, we assume:
Assumption 1: The output matrix C q is an identity matrix in all discrete states, i.e., ∀q ∈ Q,C q = I. We can easily extend our work to general C matrix assuming the continuous system is observable.
Discrete events E can be partitioned into observable events E o and unobservable events E uo , i.e., E = E o ⊍E uo . Only observable events can be detected by an observer. We denote the set of observable input events as Ψ o and a set of unobservable input events as Ψ uo . Obviously, all of the output events are observable.
The i th discrete event occurs at time t i . The continuous evolutions occur in time t ∈ [t i−1 + 1,t i ],∀i = 1,2,.... In reality, discrete events may occur between two adjacent sample times. We assume Assumption 2: The occurrence of the discrete events can be captured at sample times. At most one input event occurs within one sampling period. An output event occurs simultaneously with an input event. Note that the discrete state is changed one time step after a discrete input event occurs, that is φ (
To each discrete state q ∈ Q, we associate an invariant:
where β i and β i are scalars. An invariant is a hyperrectangle with a bounded interval on each continuous state variable. To each discrete transition φ (q,ψ) = q ′ , we associate a guard:
where c G is a scalar and s G is either −1 or 1. A guard is a hyperrectangle enclosed by the boundary of the invariant ∂ Inv q and the hyperplane:
Our definitions of guard G(q,q ′ ,ψ) and invariant Inv q indicate that c G is between the lower and upper bounds of the state variable
indicates that the transition ψ will take place if and only if the i th G state variable of s G x is greater than or equal to c G in discrete state q. An invariant Inv q indicates that the system can remain in discrete state q if and only if the continuous state
We define post-guard hyperplane as:
,ψ) is one of the hyperplanes forming the boundary of the invariant ∂ Inv q , which satisfies (3): Fig. 2 . Note that in our hybrid system formalism, no discontinuities exist in the continuous variables, which is imposed without any reset maps.
To design the hybrid observer, we need the Finite State Machine (FSM) associated with the nominal hybrid model [14] . The FSM M n is derived by extracting the discrete behavior from H n , represented by tuple (Q,Ψ,Ω,q(t 0 ),E,φ ,ζ ). To get a unique estimate of the discrete state with the hybrid observer after finite observable events, we assume Assumption 3: M n is current-state observable. Current-state observable is defined in [14] .
Definition 2: A FSM is current-state observable if there exists an integer k such that for any unknown initial discrete state, the discrete state at i can be determined from the observed input/output event pairs sequence up to i, i.e., i ≥ k. Note that one input/output event pair is considered as one input event to the hybrid observer. Thus, after the k th input/output event pair occurs, the hybrid observer can give a unique estimated discrete state.
2) Nominal Discrete States: We partition the invariants of the nominal discrete states into an intermediate region and several normal operating regions. The intermediate region R in is the union of all the intersections between the invariants of any two consecutive nominal discrete states (at least one discrete transition exists), i.e.,
For discrete state q ∈ Q n , we define a normal operating region as the set of continuous states that are in the invariant but not the intermediate region, i.e., R no,q = Inv q R in .
To have an appropriate hybrid model for which the conflict-driven method can provide detection guarantees, we pose the following assumption:
Assumption 4: The intermediate region is bounded by the hyperplane P(q,q ′ ,ψ) corresponding to the guard G(q,q ′ ,ψ) and the post-guard hyperplane L(q,q ′ ,ψ) and ∂ Inv q in each discrete state, i.e.,
The visualization of this assumption on a 2 − D system is shown in Fig. 2 
Assumption 6: The continuous input signal is bounded, and the bound is known, i.e., u ≤ µ.
To date, the most efficient way to compute the reachable set is to use zonotopes [18] . A zonotope is a Minkowski sum of a finite set of line segments.
Definition 3: Zonotope Z is a set such that:
where x c ,g i ∈ R n are the center and generators.
C. Hybrid Observer
Given the nominal hybrid model H n , we design a hybrid observer to estimate both the discrete and the continuous states, which is proposed in [14] . The hybrid observer O consists of a discrete state observer D and a continuous state observer C, as shown in Fig. 3 . The discrete state observer receives discrete input/output event pair (ψ,ω) and givesq. The estimated discrete statẽ q contains a set of estimated discrete states before the occurrence of the k th observable input/output event pair. After the occurrence of the k th observable input/output event pair,q, which contains a unique estimate, is passed to the corresponding continuous state observer. Then the continuous state observer gives an estimated continuous statex using the continuous input u and output y.
The discrete state observer is represented by a FSM which is a tuple D = (Q,E D ,−,Q n ,E D ,φ ,−), where E D = (Ψ,Ω) is the set of discrete input/output event pairs of M n and "-" means that D does not contain the corresponding component as general FSM mentioned in Section III-B. The discrete state observer is tracking the set of possible discrete states that the system can be in.
No discrete output events or discrete map are defined for discrete state observer. The construction of D is omitted here due to page limit and readers can refer [14] , [19] .
We use a Kalman filter as the continuous state observer. Note that we have different Kalman gains K q for different discrete states. Let us define Definition 4: Dwell time ∆t is the minimum time to guarantee the convergence of the estimation error. Dwell time ∆t should satisfy the condition in section 3.2 in [14] . Then we assume:
Assumption 7: The time gap between any two consecutive transitions is greater than dwell time, i.e., t i − (t i−1 + 1) > ∆t.
With bounded noise, we design Kalman filter such that the estimation error x e (t) = x(t) −x(t) is bounded when the Kalman filter reaches its steady state, i.e., ∃t ss , x e (t) ≤ θ ,t > t ss . The residual r of the system is defined as the difference between the measure output and the estimated output, r(t) =y(t) −x(t).
In the nominal discrete states, the residual r(t),t > t ss is bounded by θ + v because of bounded estimation error and noise. If r(t) > θ + v,t > t ss , then the system is in an anomalous discrete state.
D. Anomalous Discrete States
An anomaly f ∈ Ψ uo is defined as an unobservable input event that transits the system from a nominal discrete state q n ∈ Q n to an anomalous discrete state q f ∈ Q f . Arguably, the multiplicative anomalies can be represented by additive anomaly models (e.g., Section 3.5 in [4] ). Thus, we restrict our attention to additive anomaly models, i.e., y(t) = x(t) + v(t) + Γ Γ Γγ γ γ(t), where Γ Γ Γ ∈ R n×n is a diagonal matrix with binary variables. The i th diagonal variable is 1 if and only if the i th output is added with an anomalous signal γ γ γ(t) ∈ R n . Then the residual in anomalous discrete states is changed to
The conflict-driven method is guaranteed to detect the anomalies that are not consistent with the continuous dynamics of the system, i.e, the anomalies that make the residual greater than threshold θ + v. This is because of leveraging continuous state observer that is described in the previous subsection. Additionally, the proposed method extends the types of anomalies that can be detected compared to the existing methods. Perfectly attackable systems are defined by Mo, et al. in [20] as continuous systems for which anomalies caused by certain attacks can remain undetected, i.e., the residual will not increase. One of the conditions for a continuous system to be perfectly attackable is that the state matrix A q f has at least one unstable or marginally stable eigenvalue. The smart attacks that cannot be detected in perfectly attackable systems are called False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) as defined and demonstrated in [20] . One of the conditions of FDIA is that the eigenvector ξ ξ ξ corresponding to an unstable or marginally stable eigenvalue of A q f is in the span of Γ Γ Γ, i.e., ξ ξ ξ ∈ span(Γ Γ Γ). If ξ ξ ξ ∈ span(Γ Γ Γ), the anomaly will increase the residual. Now, let us define Type-C iv anomalies for the hybrid systems as:
Definition 5: Type-C iv anomaly is an anomaly that is caused by False Data Injection Attack. If an anomaly occurs at time t f , it satisfies: 1) the input-output sequence generated from the anomalous discrete state satisfies the continuous dynamics of the nominal discrete states for t ≥ t f , that is, the residual does not grow larger than the threshold θ +v; 2) the occurrence of the anomaly results in: for
Our objective is to extend the detection guarantees to Type-C iv anomalies. To establish the goal, we assume:
Assumption 8: An anomaly occurs after the continuous state observer enters its steady state, i.e., t f ≥ t ss .
IV. CONFLICT-DRIVEN ANOMALY DETECTION METHOD
In the conflict-driven method, we define three conflict types. This method checks the occurrence of the conflicts to detect anomalies. The work flow diagram is shown in Fig. 3 . Note that this method is used after the hybrid observer is in the steady state, i.e., t ≥ t ss .
Fig. 3: Conflict-driven anomaly detection method
The conflict-driven method has three steps: 1) Calculate an initial set X I (t): An initial set X I (t) is constructed as a zonotope based onx(t) and r(t), as X I (t) = (x(t),< g 1 ,...,g n >). The i th generator g i (i) = r (i) (t) +v i . Other entries of vector g i are zero. Based on (7), we have x e (i) (t) ≤ r (i) (t) + v i in nominal discrete states. Thus, we can ensure x(t) ∈ X I (t) when the system is in nominal discrete states. The initial set is changing at each time step because of the changes in the estimated continuous state and the residual.
2) Calculate the reachable set R δq (t) (X I (t)): The δq (t) time-step forward reachable set R δq (t) (X I (t)) is calculated starting from X I (t) constructed in Step 1. It satisfies
For more details about reachable set calculation using zonotopes, refer to [18] .
3) Check conflicts: We define three conflict types in this paper, as shown in Fig. 4 :
Conflict A. The volume of the initial set is larger than the bound, i.e., Vol(X
The initial set has no intersection with the invariant of the estimated discrete state (X I (t)∩Invq (t) = ∅)
Conflict C. The δq (t) time steps forward reachable set has no intersection with the invariant of the estimated discrete state, i.e., R δq (t) (X I (t)) ∩ Invq (t) = ∅.
If one of these conflicts occurs, the system is in an anomalous discrete state.
Fig. 4: Three conflict types
Note that for Step 2, we do not consider the discrete behavior in reachability analysis. The reachable set could be completely outside the invariant if δq (t) is too large, causing false alarms. To avoid false alarms and provide detection guarantees, we determine the time steps δ q for each nominal discrete state according to the following steps: 1) In Inv q , starting from the intersection of the hyperplane corresponding to the i th guard G(q,q i ,ψ i ) as defined by (4) and Inv q , we find the minimum time step δ q,i which satisfies R δ q,i +1 (P(q,q i ,ψ i )∩Inv q )∩L(q,q i ,ψ i ) ≠ ∅. Note that δ q,i may be different for different guards in the same discrete state.
2) Let δ q = min i (δ q,i ). If δ q = 0, then we only need to check Conflicts A and B in discrete state q.
Following proposition and theorem demonstrate the effectiveness of the conflict-driven method. Proposition 1 gives the upper bound for the volume of the initial set. Based on Assumption 1, in a nominal discrete state, the estimation error of the continuous state, as well as the residual, should converge. An upper bound exists for the volume of the initial set Vol(X I (t)),t > t ss , as demonstrated in Proposition 1. The increase of Vol(X I (t)) indicates the increase of the residual. Conflict A can detect anomalies that increase the residual.
Proposition 1: Given a nominal hybrid automaton H n and a hybrid observer O with bounded estimation error in steady state, i.e., ∀t > t ss , x e (t) ≤ θ , the volume of the initial set is bounded, i.e., Vol(X I (t)) ≤ Π n i=1 (2θ + 4v i ). Proof: In steady state, ∀t > t ss ,
As discussed before, Type-C iv anomaly can remain undetectable by residual-based methods and unobserved by discrete state observer. To detect this type of anomaly, we leverage the estimated states from both continuous and discrete state observers, and take advantage of observation of a discrete event. This enables us to employ the contradictions among estimated continuous and discrete states and the model parameters such as guards and invariants to detect these challenging anomalies. These contradictions are formalized in Conflicts B and C. In what follows, we set the stage to present the main contribution of this paper, which is Theorem 1. This theorem provides sufficient conditions on the lower bound of the anomalous signal, under which the conflict-driven method is guaranteed to detect Type-C iv anomalies. Towards this goal, we first find the lower bound of the estimation error that creates one of Conflicts B or C, and then relate this bound to the lower bound on the anomalous signal according to (8) .
Suppose a Type-C iv anomaly occurs at time t f which causes x First, consider the case wherex(t e ) ∈ R o no,q . The goal is to find the lower bound of the estimation error along the i th G state variable, such that the initial set X I (t e + 1) has no intersection with Inv q ′ . We denote such minimum estimation error by z * G . To find z * G , it suffices to find the minimum z such that for allx(t e + 1) the upper bound of X I (t e + 1) is smaller than the lower bound of Inv q ′ along the i th G state variable, i.e., H i Gx (t e +1)+θ +2v < c G . Note that at time t e , the continuous state along the i th G state variable is greater than or equal to c G , and smaller than the maximum value of the one time step forward reachable set from P(q,q ′ ,ψ) ∩ Inv q along the i th G state variable, i.e., c G ≤ H i G x(t e ) < ε, where ε = max(H i G R 1 (P(q,q ′ ,ψ)∩Inv q )). After the occurrence of event ψ, the state equation of the anomalous discrete state is changed to (A q ′ ,B q ′ ) and the estimated discrete state is changed to q ′ at time t e + 1. Then the set of all possible continuous states at time t e + 1 can be represented by:
By utilizing robust optimization method [21] , we can convert (10) to a linear programming problem:
where 0 ∈ R 2n×1 is a zero vector. x is in a polytopic uncertain set, i.e., Λ Λ Λx ≤ ρ 1 ρ 1 ρ 1 for problem (10) , where Λ Λ Λ ∈ R 2n×n , ρ 1 ρ 1 ρ 1 ∈ R 2n×1 and J ∈ R 2n×1 is a variable of the optimization problem.
For the second possibility, i.e.,x(t e ) ∈ R o in ∩ Inv q , we are seeking the lower bound of the estimation error along the i th G state variable such that it satisfies that the reachable set for δ q time steps from any point within the initial set X I (t e ) of the estimated continuous state has no intersection with Inv q . Considering the worst case that the continuous state is the furthest to the upper bound of ∂ Inv q along the i th G state variable, i.e., H i G x(t e ) = c G , our objective can be equivalently changed to find the minimum distance between c G and H i Gx (t e ). We denote this minimum distance by d * G . Define d = H i Gx (t e ) − c G as the distance between P(q,q ′ ,ψ) and the estimated state along the i th G state variable. With this definition, the initial set at time t e can be represented as
Starting from this initial set X I (t e ), the projection of the reachable set for δ q time steps forward onto the i th
, then it is guaranteed that the δ q time-step forward reachable set starting from this initial set X I (t e ) has no intersection with the invariant Inv q . We can pose the problem of finding d * G as the following robust optimization problem.
By employing the robust optimization techniques [21] , we can write (12) as a linear program.
where 0 is a zero vector with proper dimension, and D ∈ R n is a vector with the i th G entry d and other entries "0". x is in a polytopic uncertain set, i.e., Λ Λ Λx ≤ ρ 2 ρ 2 ρ 2 , where ρ 2 ρ 2 ρ 2 ∈ R 2n×1 and J ∈ R 2n×1 is the dual variable. Now we can present the main result of the paper. Theorem 1: Given a nominal hybrid automaton H n . Assume a Type-C iv anomaly f occurs at time t f . If an event ψ ∈ Ψ o occurs at t e > t f , which is supposed to transit the system from discrete state q to q ′ , and the guard G(q,q ′ ,ψ) is a condition on the real continuous state which is affected by the anomaly f , i.e., G(q,q ′ ,ψ) ∶ s G x (i G ) ≥ c G and x e (i G ) ≥ θ , then the conflict-driven method is guaranteed to detect the anomaly, if the anomaly satisfies:
where z * q = max q ′ z * G and d * q = max q ′ d * G can be derived by solving the robust optimization problems (10) and (12), respectively for all possible q ′ .
Proof: The solution z * G is the lower bound of the estimation error which ensures X I (t e + 1) ∩ Inv q ′ = ∅, i.e. Conflict B. By considering z * q and based on the relation between the estimation error and anomalous signal (8), we guarantee that at the discrete state q, regardless of guard, Conflict B occurs, if Γ Γ Γγ γ γ(t) > z * q + θ + 2v. Similarly, for the solution d * G , we take the maximum of these values for all possible q ′ , which is d * q . It is guaranteed that if Γ Γ Γγ γ γ(t) > d * q + θ + 2v, Conflict C occurs. By combining the two conditions, we can conclude that the conflict-driven method provides detection guarantees on the detection of anomalous signals that satisfy condition (14) . This concludes the proof.
V. SIMULATION RESULT
In this section, we revisit the TG system. We present the nominal hybrid model of the TG system and compare the conflict-driven method with a residual-based method under a Type-C iv anomaly.
The graphic representation of the nominal hybrid model H n of the TG system is shown in Fig. 5 . The train automaton has one discrete state "run". The gate automaton has two discrete states: "up" and "down" (The time of raising and lowering the gate is ignored). Although the automata product results in two discrete states, we additionally partition discrete state "run, up" to two discrete states to ensure hyperrectangle invariants as defined in (2) . The discrete transitions between discrete states are determined by discrete input events "raise the gate" c up and "lower the gate" c down . When sensor 1 detects the train and emits discrete output event s 1 , the gate controller sends out c down . When sensor 2 detects the train and emits discrete output event s 2 , the gate controller sends out c up . The invariants of the discrete states and the guards are given in Fig. 5 . The continuous state is x = [x p x v ] ⊺ , where x p ,x v are the train position and the train speed, respectively. The continuous output y(t) consists of the measured train position and speed. If the train is within 16m of the gate, the reference speed is 0.2m s. Otherwise, it is 1m s. The desired operation is that the train speed is no faster than 0.4m s when the train is within 12m of the gate. Based on Assumption 8, we only focus on the observer's steady state 1 .
The intermediate region R in and the normal operating regions of the three discrete states are shown in Fig. 6 . The time step for reachability analysis of each discrete state is δ 1 = δ 2 = 9,δ 3 = 0. Based on the definition of Type-C iv anomaly, the anomaly scenario we consider is that a ramp anomalous signal with slope 0.02m s added to the measured train position. The anomaly starts at 0s and runs until the end of the simulation, making the system violate its desired operation at 180.8s with position 71.55m and speed 0.41m s.
The comparison of the detection performance of the conflict-driven method and a residual-based method under the anomaly mentioned above is shown in Fig.  7 . The threshold of the residual-based method is θ + v = 0.15 (The unit depends on θ ). The residual-based method fails to detect the anomaly. This is because the anomalous signal is increasing slightly at each time step and the changed is hidden in the sensor noise. Therefore the measured input-output data in anomalous discrete states still satisfies the continuous dynamics of the system in nominal discrete states and the residual does not increase. The conflict-driven method detects this anomaly at time 48.2s when Conflict C occurs. The estimated discrete state is 1, but the reachable set R δ 1 (X I (482)) ∩ Inv 1 = ∅. At 48.2s, the norm of the anomalous signal is 0.96m, which is lower than the lower bound 0.98m calculated by solving robust optimization problems. That means the conflict-driven method may detect the anomalies with norm lower than the lower bound which we can provide detection guarantees. VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK In this paper, we propose a conflict-driven method, which uses the discrete and continuous variables and the hybrid model of the system, to provide detection guarantees for anomalies that are undetectable with traditional residual-based methods in addition to anomalies that can be detected with these methods. We define three different conflict types. If any one of the conflicts occurs, the anomaly is detected. Both mathematical demonstration and simulation result illustrate the effectiveness of the conflict-driven method.
One future work is to improve the hybrid observer design such that we can apply the conflict driven method to more general hybrid systems with reset maps. One potential solution is to use the Convergence Ratio method in [16] , which calculates the estimation error of the continuous state with two continuous state observers. Other future work includes the analysis of the conflictdriven method in detecting anomalies that affect both the continuous and discrete variables of the system.
